The announcement of a deal between the United States and China on rare earth magnets for a range of technologies is a welcome reprieve for many technology companies and for the defense sector as well. Yet, this deal remains fragile in the context of capricious tariffs and a dysfunctional dispute resolution system within the World Trade Organization. What is now needed is to capitalize on the deal and use it as a confidence-building measure to establish a longer-term international agreement for managing critical minerals supply. In a recent paper, myself and a coalition of scholars from across a range of mineral producing and consuming countries have argued for a “minerals trust” for the green transition. We also prepared an accompanying policy brief under the auspices of the United Nations University to provide specific policy recommendations ahead of the G7 meeting in Canada earlier this month.
The G7 issued a communique on critical minerals on June 17th which was fairly broad in scope but most noteworthy was the fact that China was not singled out for constraining mineral supply. Furthermore, the communique explicitly mentioned the role of the more multilateral G20 organization in furthering aspirations for investment, particularly through the G20 Compact for Africa. China as well as Russia are of course members of the G20 along with other key mineral producers such as Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Brazil and South Africa. It would be opportune to now move the conversations on minerals diplomacy to the G20 which will incidentally be chaired by the United States of America in 2026.
A key intermediary step will be the planned critical minerals conference this September in Chicago which has been announced already at the G7 meetings. At this conference, there needs to be consensus reached on what are realistic targets for “near-shoring” and diversification based on thigh quality ore bodies and economically feasible technologies. Mineral extraction sites are geologically determined and any policies that set targets for domestic production need to be predicated in geoscience. The challenge at present is that there are more than 400 national policies on critical minerals in various forms worldwide according to the International Energy Agency’s policy tracking tool. Most of these policies are not aligned with geoscience or economics of extraction. Furthermore, they often neglect the prospects for a circular economy as well for minerals.
The rare earths deal between the United States and China should be expanded to have a systems level approach towards building a minerals trust, particularly for those metals needed for the Green Transition. The trust would also provide opportunities to have stockpiles and source metals from recycled sources. Currently, less than 5% of rare earth magnets are recycled but this may soon change based on recent technologies that have been developed by Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich (ETH). Yet much of the infrastructure from which these magnets would be recycled is also in China. Ultimately, even with diversification efforts, China’s role in sourcing rare earths from both primary and secondary source cannot be discounted and pursuing a cooperative approach is both ecologically and economically prudent.
